

# TOWARDS TWO STATES: THE PATH TO A PALESTINIAN STATE

## LFI POLICY BRIEFING

# **LABOUR FRIENDS OF ISRAEL**

**WORKING TOWARDS A TWO STATE SOLUTION**

## **TOWARDS TWO STATES: THE PATH TO A PALESTINIAN STATE LFI POLICY BRIEFING**

**BY  
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The catastrophic war which began on 7 October has returned the Palestinian question to the top of the international agenda. For the UK and its western and Arab allies, ending the war is rightly linked to the quest to establish a Palestinian state. Only a two-state solution can reconcile the legitimate claims to national self-determination of both Jews and Palestinians and secure the legitimacy from most Israelis, Palestinians, and key Arab partners needed for long-term stability.
- Frustrating though it may seem 30 years on from Oslo, given today's reality, a Palestinian state can only be built incrementally. The Palestinian Authority lacks the capacity to replace Hamas and lead bottom-up statebuilding, and there is neither the leadership nor public appetite on either side required for long-term conflict resolution.
- The process to engender Palestinian statehood must learn the positive and negative lessons from the last three decades, including that top-down and bottom-up statebuilding must work together. When it comes to top-down diplomacy, history shows that courageous Israeli, Arab and Palestinian leadership, in a conducive international context, can be transformative. However, a Palestinian state has not been achieved through a top-down process despite repeated attempts.
- Despite the challenges, there are considerable new opportunities: the idea, associated with Benjamin Netanyahu, that the Palestinians in general, and Gaza in particular, could be sidelined in a process of regional normalisation has been destroyed. A process to establishing a non-Hamas Palestinian governance and a future reunification of the West Bank and Gaza under the authority of a reformed PA may now be possible. Netanyahu's coalition may be replaced by a more pragmatic alternative. And there are regional actors who share an overwhelming interest to integrate a rebuilt PA (as a state in the making) into a security architecture that pushes back on Iran, and enables the realisation of game-changing economic and development opportunities.
- The path to Palestinian statehood requires action on three interrelated fronts that precede any attempt to reach a conflict-ending agreement:
  - First, tackling the plight of Gaza. Beyond critical life-saving humanitarian efforts, an alternative governing authority – led by Palestinians with international support – must replace Hamas with the capacity to ensure security and manage reconstruction. Infrastructure priorities will be water, sanitation, power, healthcare, and shelter. A key component will be an international mechanism to ensure no remilitarisation, including tight controls inside the Gaza Strip to prevent the diversion of construction materials.
  - Second, wider bottom-up statebuilding. A process to re-establish the PA in the Gaza Strip must be the centrepiece of a wider effort to restore its credibility. PA reform is as important for restoring the confidence of Palestinians as Israelis. Key steps include greater freedom for civil society, reforming the courts, expanding press freedom and tackling corruption. Strengthening the PA will require Israeli cooperation, including measures to improve the economic and security situation in the West Bank and clamping down on extremist settler violence. Over the medium term, as part of coordinated trade-offs including regional states, Israeli steps should include removing illegal settlement outposts, halting construction outside the settlement blocks and transferring parts of Area C to Area B. The PA must put a stop to incitement and end the payment of salaries to terrorists. Ultimately, there must be new elections, but the mistake of allowing Hamas to stand cannot be repeated and all candidates must accept non-violence and recognition of Israel.

- Third, a new regional and international framework. Bottom-up statebuilding cannot sustain itself without a diplomatic horizon. Western and Arab states can set the context for Israeli leaders to recommit to an eventual two-state framework, including through normalisation with Saudi Arabia linked to wider regional security agreements. Israel will need guarantees backed by Arab and western powers that a future Palestinian state will be demilitarised; that its leaders will be committed to coexistence; and that it can never ally with Iran or other enemies.
- As part of this process, third-party states must play their cards – including incentives relating to recognition – carefully in the service of long-term objectives, and not squander them in response to short-term pressures. A new flexible and balanced UN Security Council resolution, endorsing a new roadmap to Palestinian statehood but conditioning it on measures including Palestinian commitments to Israeli security, may provide a way of setting a new international framework as part of this process.
- In the wake of this war and in parallel to the top-down and bottom-up efforts – and as occurred in Northern Ireland from the late 1980s – a massive investment in civic society peacebuilding, through, for instance, the establishment of an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, will also be required. Such civil society capacity can also help to produce new leaders, ideas and a greater civic stake in the statebuilding process, which can contribute to defend the two-state programme against extremists who will seek to overturn it.

## **INTRODUCTION: BUILDING A BRIDGE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE**

The catastrophic war which began on 7 October has returned the Palestinian question to the top of the international agenda. For the UK and its western and Arab allies, ending the war is linked to the quest to establish a Palestinian state. The Biden administration is leading international efforts to leverage this moment of irreversible change to advance that goal.

This is the right approach. The fundamental realities that drive this conflict remain unescapable: both Jews and Palestinians have legitimate claims to national self-determination in the same land. Only a two-state solution can ultimately reconcile those claims and secure the legitimacy from most Israelis, Palestinians, and key Arab partners needed for long-term stability.

A credible path to a Palestinian state would mean the long overdue realisation of Palestinian rights. It would also underpin Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state, unlock immense potential for regional integration and prosperity, and isolate Iran, reducing its ability to gain legitimacy through support for Palestinian extremists.

But this goal must be pursued with a clear-eyed view of the obstacles. These include: deep mutual antipathy and loss of support for a two-state compromise among Israelis and Palestinians; the lack of will or capacity of leaders to reach a conflict-ending agreement; the massive needs in the Gaza Strip and enduring influence of Hamas; the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA); and the spoiling capacity of Iran and its allies. Addressing these challenges is not helped by a polarised debate in the west, including an ideological trend that justifies Hamas' violence and rejects the very existence of Israel.

Even if a deal can secure the release of the hostages and an extended ceasefire, how can we overcome the barriers to Palestinian statehood?

First, it is important to accept – frustrating though it may seem 30 years on from Oslo – that, given today's reality, a Palestinian state can only be built incrementally.

Second, that process must learn the positive and negative lessons from the last three decades, including that top-down and bottom-up statebuilding must work together.

Third, it will be vital to leverage the unprecedented potential to expand the Arab-Israeli normalisation process, especially through an agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Finally, third party states must play their cards – including incentives relating to recognition – carefully in the service of long-term objectives, and not squander them in response to short-term pressures.

## **THE LESSONS OF PAST EFFORTS**

Past efforts in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking show that top-down diplomatic efforts must work in tandem with bottom-up statebuilding.

When it comes to top-down diplomacy, history shows that courageous Israeli, Arab and Palestinian leadership, in a conducive international context, can be transformative. The Oslo process led to acceptance of the idea of a two-state solution for majorities of Israelis and Palestinians and forged a global diplomatic consensus. It also created the institutional kernel for a Palestinian state, in the form of the PA.

Yet a Palestinian state was not achieved through a top-down process despite repeated attempts. Agreement on permanent status terms proved elusive, and trust between the leaders was thin. The process was vulnerable to determined opposition on both sides, and to external actors intent on preventing compromise, especially Iran and its allies. The failure of the process to deliver its promised benefits for either side undermined public confidence.

Palestinians and their supporters argue that the process failed to provide a convincing route to ending the occupation, instead enabling Israel to better manage it and provide cover for settlement construction. For many Israelis,

Palestinians used the process to gradually gain control in the territories without ever intending to resolve the conflict. They point to the use of Palestinian-controlled territory as a base for terrorism, and the Palestinian rejection of final-status terms in 2000, 2008 and 2014.<sup>1</sup>

The record of bottom-up Palestinian statebuilding is also chequered. While no doubt constrained by Israeli policies, the PA under Yasser Arafat and then Mahmoud Abbas has also been marked by corruption and incitement. The Gaza experience is also sobering. Israel's 2005 evacuation created for the first time a contiguous territory with international borders under PA rule. But the PA soon lost control to Hamas. Under the Israeli and Egyptian blockade and Hamas' authoritarian rule, and after repeated conflicts with Israel, the territory sank deeper into poverty. Hamas, with Iranian help, used its control to fire thousands of rockets into Israel and create an immense underground terrorist infrastructure, exploiting the influx of internationally funded building materials, especially following the 2014 conflict.

Yet there were also promising periods of bottom-up statebuilding. This current moment of conflict echoes in certain respects the period of the Second Intifada. After a wave of suicide bombings in 2002, Israel reoccupied Palestinian cities it had left as part of the Oslo process. Arafat, who was linked to the violence of the Intifada, lost credibility with Israel and the US. The 2003 internationally backed "[Roadmap](#)" plan set out reciprocal confidence-building measures including Arafat devolving power to a prime minister, as part of a process of reforming the PA. Another innovation was to propose Palestinian institution-building leading to a state in provisional borders, prior to a permanent status agreement.

The Roadmap was never implemented as planned, but the principle of bottom-up statebuilding came closest to fruition between 2007-2013 under then-Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad. Fayyad prioritised PA institutions, and made significant progress on governance, security and the economy, aided by pragmatic Israeli ministers and the facilitating role of, among others, the then-Quartet envoy Tony Blair. In 2011, various international agencies declared the PA [ready for statehood](#), (though it remained only in control of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and not the Gaza Strip). Fayyad's approach contrasted with Abbas' focus on seeking [declarative recognition in international forums](#), which fuelled tensions with Israel.

Clashes with Abbas led to Fayyad's resignation in 2013. Then, after Abbas rejected a US-brokered final status framework in 2014, Benjamin Netanyahu progressively shifted to overt opposition to a two-state solution, further undermining the PA's capacity and credibility. The case for supporting the PA in Israel was undermined by its association with [incitement](#) and the payment of salaries to convicted terrorists. Weighed down by political and governance failures, with no credible path to statehood, and facing increasingly hardline Israeli governments, the PA's support among Palestinians collapsed. Support for violence rose. Yet security cooperation has endured between Israel and the PA, driven by a shared desire to keep Hamas down in the West Bank.

## NEW CHALLENGES

In making top-down and bottom-up efforts work together towards Palestinian statehood, we face both unprecedented challenges and unprecedented opportunities.

The challenges are clear. The Gaza Strip lies in ruins. Beyond emergency relief for its devastated population, it needs a new administration to lead internationally backed reconstruction while preventing the rehabilitation of Hamas.

Yet the PA barely has the capacity and legitimacy among Palestinians to govern in the West Bank, much less the Gaza Strip. A [survey](#) in March found that 65 percent of Palestinians think the PA is a burden and 84 percent want Abbas to resign. Only a third of Palestinians support Hamas as a party (before the war it was just 22 percent). Yet given the choice between Hamas and the PA, 63 percent preferred Hamas stay in control of the Gaza Strip (although the figure was 59 percent among Gazans, 33 percent of whom favour the PA's return, compared to nine percent of West Bankers). Some 70 percent of Palestinians support Hamas' decision to attack Israel on 7 October and 90 percent believe Hamas did not commit atrocities. Palestinians are reeling from the scale of loss and destruction in Gaza which they view as a new "Nakba", as well as by the threats of violence in the West Bank.<sup>2</sup>

Israelis meanwhile are deeply shaken by the implications of 7 October for the state's capacity to fulfil its basic purpose of protecting Jewish life, especially in border areas. Israeli public confidence in the PA as a security partner is lower than ever. Israelis are enraged, not only by 7 October but by polls showing broad Palestinian support for Hamas and by the ambivalent PA response.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu is deeply unpopular with the Israeli public and fighting for political survival. Still being tried for corruption, he has been captured by his far-right coalition partners who are intent on fuelling tensions and hold a veto over diplomatic policy.

In sum, not only does the PA lack capacity to replace Hamas and lead bottom-up statebuilding, but there is neither the leadership nor public appetite on either side required for long-term conflict resolution.

At the regional level, the Iranian-led axis is emboldened. Hezbollah and Israel are exchanging fire daily, the Houthis in Yemen have emerged as a powerful disruptive actor, proxies in Syria and Iraq have attacked US and Israeli targets, and Iran has taken the unprecedented step of attacking Israel directly.

## ... YET ALSO NEW OPPORTUNITIES

These challenges are sobering, yet the new opportunities are also considerable. First, 7 October destroyed the idea, associated with Netanyahu, that the Palestinians in general, and Gaza in particular, could be sidelined in a process of regional normalisation. Instead, the Hamas attack forced the Israeli government to abandon the status quo and act to topple Hamas and substantially demilitarise the Gaza Strip by force.

The associated suffering of Palestinians has been immeasurable. At the same time, it could open a route to what was previously impossible: the establishment of non-Hamas Palestinian governance and a future reunification of the West Bank and Gaza under the authority of a reformed PA. It is accepted among a broad swathe of Israel's security establishment that Israel cannot safeguard its security without a Palestinian alternative to Hamas, and a reformed PA is ultimately the only option. Netanyahu's rejection of this has [exasperated](#) even his own defence minister.

Second, a seismic political reckoning is coming in Israel which will likely replace Netanyahu's coalition with a more pragmatic alternative. A lot will change in Israel before an election, but centrist Benny Gantz is currently best placed to lead a post-Netanyahu government. During his time as defence minister in the Lapid-Bennett rainbow coalition, Gantz recognised the need to [strengthen the PA](#). This contrasts with Netanyahu's policy of ignoring and weakening Ramallah. Gantz has also stressed the need to focus on building regional alliances and has avoided staking firm positions against the PA or Palestinian statehood.

Third, there are regional actors who share an overwhelming interest to integrate a rebuilt PA (as a state in the making) into a security architecture that pushes back on Iran, and enables the realisation of game-changing economic and development opportunities. These include Arab states which have normalised relations with Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia, which is keen to join them. Disrupting this vision was an important motivation for Hamas's 7 October attack. The potential for these states to work together on defence was boldly illustrated in the response to Iran's missile barrage at Israel in April.

Looking forward, therefore, the path to Palestinian statehood requires action on three interrelated fronts that precede any attempt to reach a conflict-ending agreement: the plight of Gaza; bottom-up statebuilding; and a new regional and international framework.

## GAZA STRIP: BUILD BACK BETTER

The most urgent needs are in the Gaza Strip. The increased influx of food and emergency shelter that began in April must be expanded and sustained unconditionally. Beyond critical life-saving humanitarian efforts, an alternative governing authority – led by Palestinians with international support – must replace Hamas with the capacity to ensure security and manage reconstruction.

Israeli policymakers have long argued that no post-Hamas administration can establish itself without a decisive military operation against Hamas' last stronghold in Rafah. The US has opposed this, citing the lack of a clear plan to protect civilians and many doubt even in Rafah that a decisive victory is possible. Military operations could be delayed indefinitely by a hostage agreement and ceasefire. If the war ends without a decisive defeat of Hamas, other ways must be found to remove Hamas' leaders and prevent the group rearming and undermining any alternative regime.

Whatever the terms for ending the fighting, re-establishing the PA in Gaza after 17 years is an immense challenge that will take time. It will require reform, new leadership, and newly trained security forces. The PA will need to draw legitimacy from a credible international commitment to reconstruction and eventual statehood.

Interim arrangements for Gaza may require an international presence, possibly under a UN-mandate, and a local component that could include the business community, community leaders, and elements of the Gaza-based PA civil service that predate Hamas' rule.

The infrastructure priorities will be water, sanitation, power, healthcare, and shelter. Achieving this will take the close coordination of international stakeholders, including Arab and western states, Israel, the PA, and UN agencies, corralled by the US. A key component is an international mechanism to ensure no remilitarisation, including securing the Rafah border with Egypt and tight controls inside the Gaza Strip to prevent the diversion of construction materials. The costs of reconstruction will be immense. After the seven-week conflict in 2014 the bill was estimated at around \$4bn. The costs this time will be [many multiples](#) of that.

Yet a new regime will make possible a sequence of [long-term projects](#) for energy, water, maritime access and connectivity with the West Bank long envisaged – [including](#) by Israeli governments – but hampered by Gaza being controlled by Hamas, and Israeli ambivalence about Palestinian statehood.

There is a widespread hope (including in Israel) that Saudi Arabia and the UAE – each with a [high stake](#) in promoting stability, moderation and normalisation – will play a central role, alongside Egypt and Jordan. (For perspective, the budget for Saudi Arabia's NEOM Red Sea “city of the future” is \$500bn.)

## WIDER BOTTOM-UP PALESTINIAN STATEBUILDING

A process to re-establish the PA in the Gaza Strip must be the centrepiece of a wider effort to restore its credibility. Ultimately, this will require elections. When that time comes, the mistake of allowing Hamas to stand cannot be repeated. All candidates must accept non-violence and recognition of Israel. Yet it will be some time before an election can be held. The stage is set for a constitutional crisis when Abbas dies. But, given the reality on the ground, there is little choice but to focus on stability, security, governance and economy for now, and prepare for elections later. Under US pressure, Abbas has already appointed Mohammed Mustafa as a new prime minister, though the extent of PA commitment to deep reform remains to be seen.

PA reform is as important for restoring the confidence of Palestinians as Israelis. Key steps that would open the political space and improve accountability for Palestinians include greater freedom for civil society, reforming the courts, expanding press freedom and tackling corruption.

To succeed, PA reform will need Israeli cooperation. In the short term, Israel should take immediate steps to improve the economic and security situation in the West Bank, including allowing West Bank Palestinian workers back into Israel; clamping down on the violence of extremist settlers; and reigning in illegal outposts. International sanctions on violent Jewish extremists are justified and should continue.

In the medium term, there are many more steps Israel can take to strengthen the PA. These include improving movement and access, upgrading economic cooperation and facilitating international investment. Politically harder but highly symbolic would be removing illegal settlement outposts and halting construction in settlements outside the major blocks (which about the 1967 Green Line and through [“land swaps”](#) could remain part of Israel in a future arrangement). More significant still would be a [phased transfer](#) of parts of Area C (currently under full Israeli control)



to Area B (under Palestinian civil control). That would allow for greater Palestinian territorial contiguity and new Palestinian homes.

However, the case in Israel for strengthening the PA is undermined by incitement to violence in Palestinian schools and media, the PA's [payment of salaries to convicted terrorists](#) or their family members, and its failure to condemn Hamas. Israeli confidence-building measures, especially the more sensitive ones, will need to be offset by parallel steps to build confidence among Israelis, taken by the PA, Arab states and other third parties. The PA must stop paying salaries to terrorists and put a stop to incitement.

The time has also come for a fundamental [reassessment of UNRWA](#). Rather than functioning as an independent humanitarian agency it has become part of the Palestinian political and governance infrastructure. While UNRWA provides vital services, it is beset with perpetual funding and management crises, and has been deeply infiltrated by Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Its unique system of perpetuating refugee status by automatically passing it on to the next generation, regardless of whether they are stateless, exacerbates the conflict rather than reducing it. The transition from PA to Palestinian state should mean, by definition, that Palestinians – certainly those living in PA-controlled areas – should not receive services from UNRWA as refugees but receive services from the PA as citizens. Much-needed support from UN agencies, NGOs and other states should be provided the same way as in other countries. It is not the amount of assistance, but how it is given, which must change.

## A NEW REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Bottom-up statebuilding cannot sustain itself without a diplomatic horizon. Arab leaders, including the Saudis, have said they cannot contribute to a new administration in the Gaza Strip without a credible and irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood.<sup>3</sup> The revitalisation of the PA as a relevant actor is similarly dependent on the credibility of this goal.

Here we face a major catch. Netanyahu's coalition rejects a two-state solution. It is likely to be months at least before an election in Israel can replace it. And even a more pragmatic Israeli government will have difficulty persuading the Israeli public that there is a credible Palestinian partner.

Western and Arab states will need to play a significant role in framing the options and providing incentives for a deeply sceptical Israeli public. The key incentive that could enable pragmatic Israeli leaders to recommit to an eventual two-state framework is the promise of expansion of normalisation to include Saudi Arabia. This would form part of a regional axis to contain Iran and its allies and exclude their proxies from the Palestinian territories. A reformed, PA-led Palestinian state can best be sold to Israelis as the greatest available hedge against the resurgence of Hamas; the path to a regional economic and security pact; and a defeat for Iran.

Israel will need guarantees backed by Arab and western powers that a future Palestinian state will be demilitarised; that its leaders will be committed to coexistence; and that it can never ally with Iran or other enemies. Given Israel's bad experience of international missions tasked with demilitarisation on its borders (notably the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to implement UN security council resolution 1701 against Hezbollah following the 2006 second Lebanon war), Israeli leaders will insist on their continuing right to act against threats in the Palestinian territories, so long as the PA lacks the capacity.

For their part, the Palestinians and their Arab supporters will want guarantees that they will not be left in the position of propping up an endless occupation, or a rump Palestinian state in provisional borders that then become permanent.

A mechanism must therefore be developed to sequence reciprocal incentives. Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, have considerable cards to offer both Israelis (recognition and normalisation) and Palestinians (economic and political support). The promise of regional integration glimpsed through the Abraham Accords and the vision of the India-Middle East-Europe corridor offer massive opportunities for Palestinians and Israelis. Symbolic gestures by Arab

leaders – for example, a visit to Jerusalem by Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia – could also have a big impact on the Israeli public, making clear the choices and opportunities before them.

Western states also have cards to play, including symbolic but significant steps relating to recognition. For Palestinians, this could mean steps towards recognition of a Palestinian state or upgrading its international legal standing. For Israel, this could include moving embassies to West Jerusalem, or expressions of sympathy for Israeli positions on security, refugees or borders. Other potential third-party incentives also include aid, trade and security cooperation, and potential contributions towards absorbing limited numbers of refugees. Western states must also act within their own societies to reaffirm Israel's fundamental legitimacy as the nation state of the Jewish people, actively opposing ideologically driven misinformation and boycott campaigns that frequently intertwine with antisemitism.

Some of these cards – in particular those related to recognition – are not easily reversed. It is vital therefore they are not squandered. There is temptation on the part of some governments to jumpstart Palestinian statehood through imminent recognition of Palestine. Such steps divorced from the wider issues between the parties and in the region, and not coordinated with a sequence of balanced incentives, are likely to garner Israeli opposition without delivering anything tangible for Palestinians.

A UN Security Council resolution, endorsing a new roadmap to Palestinian statehood but conditioning it on measures including Palestinian commitments to Israeli security, may provide a way of setting a new international framework as part of this process. But it must be flexible and balanced, and avoid imposing terms on the thorny final-status issues that must ultimately be resolved between the parties, when conditions allow.<sup>4</sup> Attempts to impose terms on Israel can backfire, being used by Israeli rejectionists to mobilise the public against the process, and by Palestinians to evade concessions on their side.

## **CONCLUSION: A MULTI-LEVEL, LONG-TERM APPROACH**

Getting from here to a Palestinian state will be an incremental process. The emphasis should be on the bottom-up, step-by-step statebuilding and reconstruction effort, directed towards a broadly defined but credible long-term goal of Palestinian statehood embedded within a set of regional arrangements enhancing Israeli security.

As occurred in Northern Ireland from the late 1980s, it will also require a massive investment in civic society peacebuilding, through, for instance, the [establishment](#) of an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Such civil society capacity can also help to produce new leaders, ideas and a greater civic stake in the statebuilding process, which can contribute to defend the two-state programme against extremists who will seek to overturn it.

The Biden administration will want the widest possible international alignment with its proposals as it continues to engage with all the parties in the region, including from the UK and other European allies. The UK can play a valuable supporting role, including in the security council and through taking a [lead](#) on the civic society agenda. It is important therefore to avoid steps taken out of alignment with the US, including on recognition of a Palestinian state, on defining the sequence of steps, or on specifying final-status terms.

Palestinians and Arab states need firm assurances regarding Palestinian statehood. At the same time, to avoid empowering opponents of compromise in Israel, third parties should adopt a consistent message that establishing a Palestinian state will be an incremental, regional process. They should stress that process will be designed to strip Hamas and other Iranian proxies of their military threat and political appeal; ensure the Palestinian territories can never be a base to attack Israel; and to underpin Israeli regional and global legitimacy.

## **ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

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## END NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> First-hand accounts include: Denis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2005); Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honour* (Simon and Schuster, 2011); Barak Ravid, “Indyk: Peace Talks Failed Due to ‘Deep Loathing’ Between Abbas, Netanyahu,” 3 July 2014, <https://www.haaretz.com/2014-07-03/ty-article/.premium/indyk-loathing-between-abbas-netanyahu-foiled-talks/0000017f-dbc5-df9c-a17f-ffd62570000>.
- <sup>2</sup> Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No (91), 15 April 2024. <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/973>.
- <sup>3</sup> See for example the [panel](#) featuring Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers at the World Economic Forum event in Riyadh, 29 April 2024.
- <sup>4</sup> See Martin Indyk, ‘The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution’, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2024.



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